

## Message Text

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ACTION SS-30

INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 CCO-00 SSO-00 NSCE-00 INRE-00 /031 W

----- 098907

P 111205Z DEC 73

FM AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV

TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 0836

INFO AMEMBASSY AMMAN

AMEMBASSY BEIRUT

USINT CAIRO

AMCONSUL JERUSALEM

AMEMBASSY JIDDA

AMEMBASSY LONDON PRIORITY

AMEMBASSY BRUSSELS PRIORITY

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EXDIS

LONDON AND BRUSSELS FOR SECRETARY'S PARTY

BEIRUT POUCH BAGHDAD

E.O.11652DS

TAGS: PFOR, PBOR, IS XF

SUBJ: HUSSIN, SADAT, FAISAL, AND PALESTINIANS: A GOI VIEW

1. SUMMARY: ACCORDING TO A LEADING GOI MID EAST EXPERT, ISRAEL AND HUSSEIN AGREE FEDAYEEN CANNOT BE PERMITTED A ROLE IN MID EAST SETTLEMENT ARRANGEMENTS OR IN RUNNING THINGS ON WEST BANK. IF HUSSEIN'S PLEBISCITE IDEA COMES TO PASS, HUSSEIN WITH QUIET ISRAELI SUPPORT CAN EASILY ASSURE ASCENDANCY OF PRO-HASHEMITE ELEMENTS, PROVIDED OTHER ARABS AND ABOVE ALL SADAT LET HUSSEIN GO ABOUT THIS. BUT ALGIERS SUMMIT DECISION NAMING PLO SOLE REPRESENTATIVE OF PALESTINIANS IS DIRECT THREAT TO HUSSEIN, AND SADAT MUST HAVE BEEN BEHIND IT. THUS, PLUS

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CAREFUL REREADING OF SADAT'S OCT 16 SPEECH, SUGGEST SADAT NOW HAS INTER-ARAB LEADERSHIP AMBITIONS, PLANS TO PUSH FEDAYEEN CAUSE, AND NOT READY TO MAKE REAL PEACE WITH ISRAEL. IT IS FAISAL WHO COULD TURN SADAT AROUND RE HUSSEIN. BUT FAISAL EVIDENTLY UNDERESTIMATES (A) STRENGTH OF HIS OWN INFLUENCE ON SITUATION, PLUS (B) DANGERS FOR HIS OWN REGIME INHERENT IN

GROWING PRO-FEDAYEEN PRESSURES ON HUSSEIN.

END SUMMARY:

2. MID EAST AFFAIRS DIRECTOR VERED OF FONMIN IN COURSE OF INFORMAL CONVERSATION DEC 7 WITH EMBOFF AND VISITOR FROM EMB JIDDA LAUNCHED INTO LENGTH EXPOSITION OF HER VIEWS ON ISSUE OF FEDAYEEN INVOLVEMENT IN MID EAST PEACE SETTLEMENT AND IDEA OF SEPARATE PALESTINIAN ENTITY ON WEST BANK. MRS VERED'S VIEWS PROBABLY REPRESENT THINKING ON THE SUBJECT BY MORE SENIOR LEVELS IN GOI SO ARE WORTH REPORTING IN SOME DETAIL.

3. MRS VERED SAID KING HUSSEIN AND ISRAEL SEE COMPLETELY EYE TO EYE ON UNACCEPTABILITY OF FEDAYEEN AS NEGOTIATING PARTNER AND TOTAL IMPOSSIBILITY OF PERMITTING ESTABLISHMENT OF INDEPENDENT PALESTINIAN STATE ON WEST BANK. SHE DESCRIBED HUSSEIN'S PROPOSAL FOR PLEBISCITE ON WEST BANK FOLLOWING INTERIM PERIOD AFTER ISRAELI WITHDRAWAL FROM WEST BANK AS A TACTIC, SPEAKING CONFIDENTIALLY AND FOR USG EARS ONLY, SHE SAID ISRAELIS HAD NO PROBLEMS WITH TACTIC BECAUSE HUSSEIN, WITH ISRAELIS COOPERATING BEHIND SCENES, COULD ENSURE THAT SUCH PLEBISCITE CAME OUT THE RIGHT WAY. THERE WERE STILL PLENTY OF PRO-HASHEMITES ON WEST BANK AND ALSO IN GAZA STRIP; THEY WERE JUST LYING LOW CURRENTLY, DURING PERIOD OF PRO-PLO EUPHORIA. DURING INTERVENING PERIOD BEFORE PROPOSED PLEBISCITE THERE WOULD CONTINUE TO BE ISRAELI PRESENT ON WEST BANK IN PERSON OF TOURISTS AND PILGRIMS, AND THROUGH PRESENCE AND IN OTHER WAYS ISRAEL COULD HELP HUSSEIN KEEP EXTREMIST ELEMENTS FROM COMING FROM ABROAD TO WEST BANK.

4. MRS VERED CONTINUED THAT HUSSEIN COULD SEE HANDWRITING ON WALL CLEARLY ENOUGH FROM EGYPTIAN-STATE-MANAGED ALGIERS SUMMIT. SUMMIT DECISION NAMING PLO SOLE REP OF PALESTINIANS WAS NOT ONLY AN INDIRECT THREAT TO HUSSEIN, IN ITS IMPLICATION THAT HUSSEIN'S SINGLE ROLE ON WEST BANK WOULD BE TO RECEIVE TERRITORY

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BACK FROM ISRAEL AND THEN TO TURN IT OVER PROMPTLY TO FEDAYEEN. IT WAS ALSO DIRECT THREAT TO LEGITIMACY OF HUSSEIN REGIME ON EAST BANK ITSELF, SINCE MAJORITY OF INHABITANTS THERE, AS WELL, WERE PALESTINIANS, FOR WHOM PLO ALSO WAS NAMED "SOLE REPRESENTATIVE."

5. MRS VERED REITERATED THAT WITH ISRAELI CLANDESTINE HELP, HUSSEIN COULD MANAGE SITUATION FINE, PROVIDED REST OF ARAB STATES LEFT HIM ALONE. KEY WAS WHETHER SADAT WANTED HUSSEIN TO MANAGE. FOR TIME BEING, HUSSEIN HAD EFFECTIVELY OUTMANEUVERED SADAT WITH JORDANIAN THREAT NOT TO ATTEND GENEVA PEACE CONF, WHICH WOULD BADLY DISRUPT SADAT'S PLANS THIS THREAT HAD CAUSED HIM (TEMPORARILY) TO EASE PRESSURES ON HUSSEIN.

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6. MRS VERED EXPRESSED WORRY THAT SADAT NOW HAD INTER-ARAB LEADERSHIP AMBITIONS, DESPITE SIGNS BEFORE OCTOBER WAR THAT SADAT WAS TURNING INWARD AND WANTED TO CONCENTRATE ON EGYPT'S DEVELOPMENT. IF SADAT HAD CAUGHT INTER-ARAB BUG, HE WOULD PUSH FEYDAYEEN CAUSE, AND PEACE PROSPECTS IN REGION WOULD BE DIM. SHE SAW TWO IMPORTANT AND DISTRWCING INDICATIONS OF SADAT'S INTENTIONS: HIS OCTOBER 16 SPEECH, AND ALGIERS SUMMIT DECISION BACKING PLO. SADAT SPEECH HAD TO BE TAKEN SERIOUSLY BECAUSE SADAT WAS SINCERE MAN WHO SPEAKS HIS MIND. SPEECH SHOWED SADAT VISUALIZED TWO STAGES: A) REGAINING OF TERRITORIES OCCUPIED SINCE 1967, WHICH WAS DUTY OF EGYPT, JORDAN AND SYRIA AND FOR WHICH PURPOSE SADAT WAS WILLING TO NEGOTIATE WITH ISRAEL; AND B) "PEACE" CONFERENCE, WHICH WAS TO "RESTORE RIGHTS OF PALESTINIANS." CONFERENCE, SADAT HAD SAID, WOULD BE ATTENDED BY ARAB STATES, FEDAYEEN AND INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY--NO MENTION OF ISRAEL; CONFERENCE IN OTHER WORDS WOULD DECIDE WHAT TO DO NOT WITH, BUT ABOUT, ISRAEL. AS FOR ALGIERS SUMMIT, SADAT HAD ARRANGED IT AND THEREFORE PRESUMABLY HAD ARRANGED AS WELL ITS DECISION TO NAME PLO SOLE REPRESENTATIVE OF PALESTINIANS. SADAT NOW COULD USE THIS SUMMIT DECISION AS ALIBI WHEN TALKING WITH WEST, BY EXPLAINING HIS HANDS WERE TIED AND HE HAD SECRET

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NO CHOICE BUT TO INSIT ON PLO PARTICIPATION IN SECOND PHASE OF PEACE CONFERENCE.

7. TURNING TO KING FAISAL, MRS VERED REGARDED HIS PASSIVITY TOWARD STRUGGLE BETWEEN FEDAYEEN AND HUSSSF AS CONTRARY

TO FAISAL'S OWN INTERESTS. FAISAL EVIDENTLY DID NOT RECOGNIZE WHERE CURRENT TREND WOULD ULTIMATELY LEAD, NOR DID HE APPRECIATE CONSIDERABLE IMPACT HIS OWN ATTITUDE HAD ON SITUATION. PERHAPS IT WAS TRUE FAISAL NEEDED TO PAY LIP SERVICE TO FATAH, AS LEAST AMONG FEDAYEEN EVILS, BUT IT WAS NAIVE FOR FAISAL TO HOPE ARAFAT COULD EVENTUALLY GAIN PREDOMINENCE OVER MOST EXTREMIST AND MARXIST FEDAYEEN ELEMENTS, INSTEAD OF REVERSE HAPPENING. AND FAISAL'S PANDERING TO FATAH WAS NO REASON FOR HIM NOT TO GIVE HUSSEIN SUBSTANTIAL BEHIND-SCENES SUPPORT. MOST IMPORTANT THING FAISAL COULD DO RIGHT NOW WOULD BE TO PRESS SADAT TO LEAVE HUSSEIN WITH FREE HAND.

8. MRS VERED WAS AT A LOSS TO UNDERSTAND WHY FAISAL DID NOT SEE WHAT WAS SO CLEAR TO BOTH HUSSEIN AND ISRAEL; FEDAYEEN TAKEOVER OF WEST BANK WOULD COMPLETELY RADICALIZE ENTIRE ARAB WORLD. ESTABLISHMENT OF INDEPENDENT PALESTINIAN ENTITY IN WEST BANK AND GAZA STRIP WOULD LEAD AUTOMATICALLY TO FEDAYEEN TAKEOVER BECAUSE NO MODERATE LEADERSHIP EXISTS AMONG PALESTINIANS AND IT WOULD TAKE YEARS TO DEVELOP ONE. RULERS OF ANY PALESTINIAN ENTITY WOULD IMMEDIATELY START BEATING THROUGHOUT ARAB WORLD NOT ONLY IRREDENTIST DRUMS AGAINST BOTH ISRAEL AND JORDAN, BUT ALSO IDEALOGICAL ONES AGAINST CONSERVATIVE OR MODERATE ARAB REGIMES, INCLUDING ABOVE ALL FAISAL'S.

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